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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This appeal involves the Department of Labor's finding that Appellant Siranoush Hiatt

("Hiatt") is ineligible for unemployment insurance because her employment with Health Care
Idaho Credit Union ("HCIC") was terminated for workplace-related misconduct. This appeal also
involves the Industrial Commission's Decision and Order that Hiatt is ineligible for unemployment
benefits because HCIC discharged Hiatt for employment-related misconduct.

B. Proceedings Before the Department of Labor and the Industrial Commission
Hiatt applied for unemployment benefits on February 28, 2018. On August 24, 2018, the
Idaho Department of Labor ("IDOL") issued a Personal Eligibility Determination that Hiatt was
not eligible to receive unemployment benefits because HCIC discharged Hiatt for work-related
misconduct; specifically, that Hiatt's actions fell below the standard of behavior the employer had
a right to expect.
Hiatt appealed IDOL's Determination and, on September 25, 2018, IDOL conducted an
audio-recorded telephonic hearing. The IDOL Appeals Examiner issued its Decision on September
28, 2018. The Appeals Examiner denied Hiatt's unemployment benefits claim and found that
HCIC discharged Hiatt for misconduct in connection with employment-related misconduct as
defined by Idaho Code§ 72-1366 (5).
On October 9, 2018, Hiatt appealed the IDOL Appeal Examiner's decision to the Idaho
Industrial Commission ("Commission"). Following briefing by Hiatt, the Commission issued its
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Decision and Order. The Commission conducted a de novo review of the record and affirmed
IDOL's finding that Hiatt is ineligible for unemployment benefits by finding that Hiatt was
discharged for employment-related misconduct.

C. Statement of Facts
On June 25, 2016, HCIC hired Hiatt as a mortgage loan officer. On February 25, 2017,
Hiatt suffered a workplace injury, specifically a brain trauma. Agency Record: Exhibits ("R.") p.
40-44. As a result of her workplace injury, and at the direction of her doctor, Hiatt began working
reduced hours and receiving workers compensation. Id.
In the ensuing months, Hiatt felt that HCIC management, specifically HCIC's CEO, Fallon
Eisenbarth ("Eisenbarth"), resented Hiatt's reduced working hours. R. p. 4, 52. Hiatt became
fearful that she would lose her job as a result of her disability. R. p. 40-44, 52. Specifically, Hiatt
informed her doctors, and the Industrial Commission investigating agent, that she feared losing
her job in retaliation for her reduced working hours. Id.
On or about September 27, 2017, HCIC reduced Hiatt's pay despite Hiatt performing her
job at a high level. R. p. 12, 40. On or about December 13, 2017, HCIC amended its short-term
disability and sick leave policy; the practical consequences of this change forced Hiatt to expend
accrued sick time to offset her reduced hours. R. p. 30-37. Hiatt interpreted such actions by HCIC
as discrimination, and as attempts to get rid of Hiatt.
Sometime before Feb. 21, 2018, the HCIC Board determined that it would again decrease
Hiatt's pay scale. On February 21, 2018, Eisenbarth informed Hiatt that her compensation plan
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would be changed to a no-comm1ss10n, flat salary wage. Agency Record: Audio Hearing
Transcript ("R. Aud.") p. 12. In the previous year, Hiatt's wages totaled nearly $156,000.00; the
new pay-cut would reduce Hiatt's pay to only $72,000.00. Id. While Eisenbarth maintains that
financial considerations motivated HCIC's decision, no other employee took a pay-cut and at least
one other HCIC employee received a raise. R. Aud. p. 13, L. 2; R. p. 27.
Upon hearing of this most recent pay-cut, Hiatt responded by asking to speak with the
HCIC Board of Directors concerning the pay-cut and why it occurred. R. Aud. p. 41 L. 19-20; R.
p. 52. At no time during this exchange did Hiatt raiser her voice or yell. R. p. 39, 52. Later that
day, Eisenbarth delivered to Hiatt a written reprimand in which she cites Hiatt's unprofessional
behavior as being insubordinate, specifically identifying, "rais[ing] your voice in an unprofessional
manner", as the behavior that would not be further tolerated. R. p. 9. The February 21 reprimand
letter also requested that Hiatt prepare for a meeting the next day to discuss Hiatt's pay-cut. Id.
On February 22, 2018, Eisenbarth, Hiatt, and HCIC Operations Supervisor Arminda
Kindrick ("Kindrick") entered a closed conference room to conduct the meeting regarding Hiatt' s
reduced compensation ("Feb. 22 Meeting"). R. p. 3, 5, 10, 20, 27. The parties began by discussing
the reasons behind Hiatt's new, reduced compensation plan. R. p. 10, 27. Thereafter, Hiatt reported
that she believed her pay cut was the result of discrimination and retaliation for her workplace
injury and accompanying reduced hours. R. p. 10, 27. As the meeting continued, Hiatt requested
to speak to the HCIC Board of Directors to report her belief that she was being retaliated or
discriminated against for her injury. R. Aud. p. 19, L. 19-20; R. Aud. p. 10, L. 20-21; R. Aud. p.
45 L. 23; R. p. 4, 10, 27. Despite the difficulty of reporting workplace discrimination and
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retaliation, and the frustration of having her pay reduced by more than half, Hiatt did not raise her
voice. R. p. 4, 10, 27, 53. In response to Hiatt’s request to report the retaliation to the Board of
Directors, Eisenbarth terminated Hiatt’s employment for insubordination. R. Aud. p. 45, L 22-23;
R. p. 6, 20.
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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A. Do the Commission’s findings support its conclusion that Hiatt’s conduct
constituted workplace-related misconduct so as to render her ineligible for
unemployment benefits?
B. Can an employee’s reporting of discrimination render her ineligible for
unemployment benefits?
C. Should an employee be protected for negotiating the conditions of her work rather
than voluntarily quitting when good cause exists to do so?
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III.

ARGUMENT
A. The Commission's findings do not support its conclusion that Hiatt is ineligible for
unemployment benefits.

1)

Standard of Review

In appeals from the Industrial Commission, the Idaho Supreme Court is limited to
reviewing questions oflaw. Idaho Const. Art. V, § 9; Folks v. Moscow Sch. Dist. # 281, 129 Idaho
833, 836, 933 P.2d 642, 645 (1997). Welch v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 127 Idaho 361, 363, 900 P.2d
1372, 1374 (1995). The Court will uphold the decisions of the Commission unless, as a matter of
law, the findings of fact do not support the order. I.C. § 72-732 (4); Locker v. How Soel, Inc. 151
Idaho 696,699,263 P.3d 750, 753 (2011). The burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance
of the evidence falls strictly on the employer, and where the burden is not met, benefits must be
awarded to the claimant." Harris v. Elec Wholesale, 141 Idaho 1, 3, 105 P.3d 2667, 269 (2004);
IDAPA 09.01.30.275.01.

2)

Argument

An individual 1s only entitled to unemployment benefits where "[t]he claimant's
unemployment is not due to the fact . . . that [s]he was discharged for misconduct in connection
with [her] employment." I.C. § 72-1366 (5). Misconduct in connection with employment is defined
as one of the following:
"( 1) Disregard of Employer's Interest. A willful, intentional disregard of the
employer's interest. (2) Violation of Reasonable Rules. A deliberate violation
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of the employer's reasonable rules. (3) Disregard of Standards of Behavior. If
the alleged misconduct involves a disregard of a standard of behavior which the
employer has a right to expect of his employees, there is no requirement that
the claimant's conduct be willful, intentional, or deliberate. The claimant's
subjective state of mind is irrelevant."
IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02 (c); See also, Adams v. Aspen Water, Inc. 150 Idaho 408,413,247 Idaho
P.3d 635, 641 (2011).
The Commission contends that Hiatt's misconduct arises under third prong - the "standards
of behavior" analysis. Additionally, HCIC discharged Hiatt for insubordination, 1 The Idaho
Supreme Court has recognized insubordination as one form of conduct that violates the standard
of behavior test. Avery v. B & B Rental Toilets, 97 Idaho 611, 549 P.2d 270 (1976).
In determining whether an alleged misconduct disregards a standard of behavior which the
employer has a right to expect, the test is two-fold, "(1) Whether the claimant's conduct fell below
the standard of behavior expected by the employer; and (2) Whether the employer's expectation
was objectively reasonable in the particular case." IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02 (c)(i-ii); See also,

Matthews v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 101 Idaho 657, 659, 619 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1980).
Insubordination is an employee's "deliberate or willful refusal. .. to obey a reasonable order
or directive which an employer is authorized to give and entitled to have obeyed. Locker, 151

1

During the telephonic hearing held by the Department of Labor, Eisenbarth was directly asked what the reason was
for Hiatt's discharge, to which Eisenbarth responded, "Insubordination." R. Aud. P. 9, L. 3-4 Additionally, HCIC
listed "Insubordination" as the cause of discharge on its Notice of Claim and Employer Separation Statement filed
with IDOL. R. p. 6.
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Idaho at 700,263 P.3d at 754 (quoting Avery, 97 Idaho at 614,549 P.2d at 273). Thus, despite the
admonition in case law and regulations that the "standards of behavior" analysis does not require
a showing that the employee's behavior was subjectively willful, intentional, or deliberate,
insubordination does require a showing ofwillfulness. 2
The Commission's findings, therefore, must demonstrate that Hiatt was insubordinate in
order to maintain its conclusion that Hiatt' s actions were an employment related misconduct.
Specifically, the Commission must demonstrate that Hiatt deliberately or willfully refused a
reasonable order or directive which HCIC was authorized to give and Hiatt was entitled to obey.

i.

The Commission's findings do not establish that Hiatt's actions
were deliberate or willful.

The Commission makes no finding that Hiatt's actions were willful or deliberate. Instead,
the Commission states, contrary to the definition of insubordination in Locker, that the employer
need not demonstrate that Hiatt's behavior was willful or deliberate. Nonetheless, the record shows
that Hiatt' s behavior was neither deliberate nor willful such as to establish insubordination.
When reviewing claims of insubordination, this court looks to the facts of each case to
determine whether an employee's conduct is reasonable under the circumstances; thus, an
employee's expression of disagreement or discontentment to her employer may not be an act of

2

Insubordination appears to be a hybrid ground for employment related misconduct. This court has recognized
insubordination as a conduct violating the "standards of behavior" prong. Avery, 97 Idaho at 614, 549 P.2d at 273. It
has also defined insubordination as a deliberate or willful refusal; but elsewhere clarified that the subjective intent of
the employee is irrelevant in a "standards of behavior" analysis.
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insubordination. Locker, 151 Idaho at 700, 263 P.3d at 754. Although an employer cannot expect
employees to at all times be absolutely docile or servile, it can expect employees to comply with
the employer’s direct orders. Stark v. Assisted Living Concepts, Inc., 152 Idaho 506, 509, 272 P.3d
478, 481 (2012). Thus, the applicable law takes the social realities of the workplace into account.
Locker, 151 Idaho at 700, 263 P.3d at 754.
The Idaho Supreme Court, in reviewing whether an employee’s outburst was intentional
insubordination or a “comparatively nonserious disrespect,” considered the nature of the
interaction between the employer and the employee. Folks, 129 Idaho at 837, 933 P.2d at 646.
Factors considered include: the emotional state of the employee; specifically, that the employee
had received upsetting news the previous day regarding an employment decision effecting her
main work; and, that the employer was aware of the employee’s emotional state. Id.
These factors, and Hiatt’s intentionality, were not considered by the Commission. There is
ample evidence in the record however, to demonstrate that, similar to the fact considered in Folk,
Hiatt was under extreme emotional stress. The day prior to her discharge, Hiatt was informed that
her pay would be cut by more than half. When Hiatt expressed her concern that the pay-cut was in
response to her disability, she was sent home. At the meeting the next day, Hiatt was brought into
a closed-door meeting with the CEO and the Operation Supervisor; this was an unusual meeting
arrangement that made Hiatt anxious and fearful. R. Aud. p. 43-44. Hiatt had previously feared
losing her job, was given a massive pay-cut, and now had a closed-door meeting with two members
of management. The evidence demonstrates that Hiatt’s conduct was an emotional reaction to a
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stressful situation. As such, Hiatt lacked the requisite intent and her behavior does not rise to the
level of intentional insubordination. See Folks, 129 Idaho at 838, 933 P.2d at 647.

ii.

The Commission’s findings do not establish that Hiatt disregarded
a “standards of behavior.”

The Commission’s findings, even applied to the regular “standards of behavior” analysis,
fail to establish Hiatt’s conduct was employment-related misconduct. Under the “standards of
behavior” analysis, the employer must show, “(1) Whether the claimant's conduct fell below the
standard of behavior expected by the employer; and (2) Whether the employer's expectation was
objectively reasonable in the particular case.” Folks, 129 Idaho at 837, 933 P.2d at 646.

a. Hiatt’s behavior was not misconduct because her actions
complied with HCIC’s communicated expectations
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated, an “employer’s expectations are ordinarily reasonable
only where they have been communicated to the employee.” Id. Further, an employee can only be
held accountable for failing those expectations that he or she understood, explicitly or implicitly,
and was capable of satisfying. Puckett v. Idaho Dep't of Corrections, 107 Idaho 1022, 695 P.2d
407 (1985).
What communication did not or did not occur before the alleged failure to meet a “standard
of behavior” is key in determining whether the employer made it clear that such behavior is not
appropriate. Following the February 21 interaction between Eisenbarth and Hiatt, Eisenbarth
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informed Hiatt that she was reprimanded for “unprofessional conduct;” specifically, that Hiatt
engaged in insubordinate conduct by raising her voice. R. p. 9. Thus, Eisenbarth communicated to
Hiatt that raising her voice in an unprofessional manner was the insubordinate behavior that would
not be tolerated.
Eisenbarth only identifies the raising of Hiatt’s voice as insubordinate behavior. The events
precipitating Eisenbarth’s reprimand were contentious in so far as Hiatt received a drastic pay-cut
and indicated her concern that she was being discriminated against. Yet, of all the interactions on
February 21, Eisenbarth only identifies Hiatt’s raising of her voice as the unprofessional behavior.
Thus, the standard of behavior which was communicated to Hiatt, and the expectation which she
understood, was to refrain from raising her voice.
The Commission, however, does not make a finding that Hiatt raised her voice at the Feb.
22 Meeting. While the Commission briefly mentions Eisenbarth’s contention that Hiatt raised her
voice at the Feb. 22 Meeting, the Commission does not find that Hiatt raised her voice, only that
Hiatt’s behavior was deteriorating, accusatory, or combative. The record does not contain
substantial or competent evidence to find that Hiatt raised her voice during the Feb. 22 Meeting.
In order to find that Hiatt’s conduct was misconduct, said behavior had to be communicated
to her. Because Hiatt did not breach a communicated expectation or order, Hiatt did not breach a
standard of behavior communicated to her. Thus, the Commission’s findings of fact do not support
its conclusion of law.
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b. Hiatt’s behavior was not misconduct because HCIC’s
expectations did not flow naturally from the employment
relationship.
In addition to communicating a behavioral expectation to the employee, the employer’s
expectations must be reasonable. “An employer’s expectations are ordinarily reasonable only
where they have been communicated to the employee, some expectations and standards of
behavior flow normally from an employment relationship and need not be communicated to the
employee to support a claim of employment related misconduct.” Folk, 129 Idaho at 838, 933 P.2d
at 647 (internal citations omitted). Some expectations flow normally from an employment
relationship; but, “if certain practices or expectations are not common among employees in general
or within a particular enterprise and have not been communicated by the employer to the employee,
they cannot serve as a proper basis for a charge of employee misconduct.” Davis v. Howard O.
Miller Co., 107 Idaho 1092, 1094, 695 P.2d 1231, 1233 (1984).
The Feb. 22 Meeting was not a common occurrence. The record indicates that Hiatt had
never had a closed-door meeting with two members of management, and the record indicates that
Hiatt was the only one effected by pay-cuts. The only clear instruction given to Hiatt for the tense
and novel meeting that was going to occur, was that she was not to raise her voice. Hiatt was told
that the purpose of the Feb. 22 Meeting was to discuss the pay-cut; any expectation regarding
deference or docility that might flow naturally from the normal work-relationship are inapplicable
to the Feb. 22 Meeting, as it was by nature a contentious meeting concerning Hiatt’s wage being
reduces by more than 50% and Hiatt’s reporting of disability discrimination.
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The written reprimand given to Appellant on February 21, 2018 specifically asks Appellant
to return the following day ready to discuss the issues. At the February 22 Meeting, Appellant
talked about her concerns regarding pay scale and discussed her concerns that she was being
retaliated against for receiving worker's compensation benefits. Thus, Appellant engaged in
behavior that was initiated by, and discussed topics that were presented by, Eisenbarth. Appellant's
behavior, therefore, conformed not only to a reasonable expectation standard, but to the
expectations of Eisenbarth.

B. As a matter of policy, reporting discrimination cannot be a workplace-related
misconduct.
The purpose of Idaho unemployment security law is to "set aside unemployment reserves
to be used for workers who are unemployed through no fault of their own." I.C. § 72-1302. The
record establishes that before February 21, Hiatt feared she was being discriminated against
because of her disability. On both February 21 and 22, Hiatt reported or attempted to report to her
supervisor a belief that she was being discriminated against on the basis of her disability. HCIC
and the Commission contend that Hiatt' s "insubordination" or "unprofessional behavior" while
reporting this discrimination was both satisfactory to discharge her, and to render her ineligible for
unemployment benefits.
Hiatt' s reporting, however, is a protected activity under the Idaho Commission on Human
Rights. I.C. § 67-5901 et seq ("ICHR"). Under the ICHR, it is unlawful to discriminate on the basis
of disability, and it is unlawful to discriminate against a person who opposes such discrimination.
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I.C. § 67-5909; I.C. § 67-5911. A claim under I.C. § 67-5911 is commonly known as a retaliation
claim, and requires a plaintiff demonstrate that (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) suffered
an adverse employment action; and, (3) there is a causal link between the two. Mendez v. Univ.
Health Servs. Boise State Univ., 163 Idaho 237, 409 P.3d 817 (2018).
The record is far too sparse to litigate the issue of retaliation or discrimination under the
ICHR. However, the record does contain enough evidence to demonstrate that Hiatt was engaging
in a protected activity—reporting workplace discrimination. Hiatt feared she would lose her job
due to her disability, Hiatt believed she had been discriminated against, and on February 21 and
22, Hiatt reported this discrimination to the HCIC CEO and attempted to meet with the HCIC
Board to further report the discrimination. Hiatt was then discharged while making these reports.
Not all actions which justify termination also justify a finding of unemployment
ineligibility. The Idaho Supreme Court does not,
“…require that any violation of any rule of an employer will, per se, constitute
misconduct such as will result in the denial of unemployment compensation
benefits upon discharge. While an employer may…discharge an employee for
violation of any rule, such does not, per se, amount to “misconduct” constituting a
bar to unemployment compensation benefits.”
Wroble v. Bonners Ferry Ranger Station, 97 Idaho 900, 902, 556 P.2d 859, 861 (1976).
The Court clearly indicates that there are some actions which warrant dismissal of an employee,
but which will not rise to the level of employment-related misconduct so as to bar unemployment
benefits.
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The ICHR seeks to protect workers from discrimination, going as far as creating a cause of
action for adverse actions taken against employee's seeking the ICHR's protections. Idaho's
unemployment security law also seeks to protect employees. And yet, if Hiatt is deemed ineligible
for unemployment benefits, the purpose of the latter policy will be thwarted because Hiatt sought
the protections of the former. Reporting discrimination is an inherently anxious and tense
experience, the ICHR retaliation claim is meant to alleviate an employee's fears and encourage
them to report discrimination. If a reporting employee must maintain proper decorum, calmness,
and amicability while they report workplace discrimination, lest they not only lose their job but
also their right to unemployment benefits, then even fewer employees will come forward. By
recognizing that, as a matter of public policy, an employee reporting discrimination or engaging
in similar protected activities will remain eligible for unemployment benefits, the policies of both
Idaho's Human Rights Commission, and Idaho's unemployment security law, will be furthered.

C. As a matter of policy, it should not be workplace misconduct for an employee to
attempt to negotiate conditions of employment rather than voluntarily quitting.
HCIC's drastic pay-cut is the type of "good cause related to employment" occurrence
where, if Hiatt had voluntarily quit, she would have received unemployment benefits. IDAPA
09.01.30.450. An employee who with good cause terminates their employment, shall be entitled
to unemployment benefits. I.C. §72-1366.
Receiving a 50% pay cut is good cause for voluntarily quitting. Kyle v. Beco Corp., 109
Idaho 267, 707 P .2d 378 (1985). Had Hiatt refused to return to work on February 22, by voluntarily
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quitting, she would have been eligible for unemployment benefits. Instead, Hiatt returned to work
in order to further discuss the pay-cut and discrimination. HCIC goaded Hiatt into a contentious
conversation, and instead of choosing unemployment, Hiatt tried to discuss the reasons for of her
pay-cut and attempted to keep her job.
Hiatt should not be punished for making a good faith effort to continue her employment
and negotiate reasonable wages. Hiatt came to the table on February 22 rather than quitting.
Employers should not be able to drastically diminish an employee’s wages and then, when asking
them to discuss such a pay-cut, terminate their employment for opposing such actions. Policy is
better served in promoting employer-employee negotiations, and in prohibiting an employer from
baiting employees into antagonistic conflict.
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IV.

CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission has failed to establish that Hiatt' s discharge was due to

employment-related misconduct. The statutes, authorities, and record herein all evidence that: (1)
Hiatt was discharged for insubordination, but neither the Commission's findings, nor the record,
establish that Hiatt was insubordinate so as to render her ineligible for unemployment benefits; (2)
Hiatt complied with the communicated expectations of her employer; and, (3) Hiatt was engaged
in a protected activity when she was discharged, and public policy is furthered by protecting her
access to unemployment benefits. As such, the Decision and Order of the Industrial Commission
should be overruled, and Hiatt should be deemed eligible for unemployment benefits.

Respectfully submitted this 23 rd day of May 2019.
McCONNELL WAGNER SYKES & STACEY PLLC

By:
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Isl Michael A. Short
Michael A. Short, Attorneys For
Plaintiff, Siranoush M. Hiatt
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